We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, of fixed duration. We concentrate on Markovian strategies. We show by way of example that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they always exist in Markovian publicsignal correlated strategies. To do so, we develop criteria for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium via differential inclusions, both directly and also by modeling continuous-time stochastic as differential games and using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We also give an interpretation of equilibria in mixed strategies in continuous-time, and show that approximate equilibria always exist.
Introduction

Background
Continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, are often used to model interaction in which players can take actions or events can occur at any time, not just at discrete points. Recent developments suggest that they may provide the correct framework for an array of situations in which the states change abruptly rather than smoothly. Furthermore, their study holds promise of results that can give us a better understanding of several types of dynamic games; see Neyman (2012) .
Stochastic games in discrete time were introduced by Shapley (1953) . In a discrete-stochastic game, players play in stages. At each stage, the game is in one of the finitely many available states, and each player chooses an action from the finite action spaces in that state. The actions they choose then determine a probability distribution on the state space, which is used to choose the state at the next stage. There is also a payoff at each stage, which is a function of both the current state and the action profile. Zachrisson (1964) introduced continuous-time Markov games (although his paper deals with both discrete-and continuous-time games). In the continuoustime model, the game is also always in one of the finitely many available states, and at each point in time each player chooses an action from a finite action space. Again, the players influence the transitions to the other states; however, in this case, the players only determine the transition rate (also referred to as the intensity). We again assume that at each point in time there is a payoff which is a function both of the current state and action profile.
Both Shapley (1953) and Zachrisson (1964) consider only two-player zerosum games. Zachrisson (1964) considers games of a finite, pre-determined, and commonly known duration, and his methods of evaluating the stream of payoffs in continuous-time is simply to integrate over time. Furthermore, he considers only Markovian strategies: Players choose their action as a function of time and the current state only. These strategies do not depend on any past states or any past actions of previous players.
Indeed, whether we are studying discrete-time games of fixed duration (the payoff is just the sum or the average of the stage-by-stage payoffs), continuoustime games of fixed duration (the payoff is the integral of the stream of payoffs), zero-sum games or non-zero-sum games, Markovian strategies are a natural class to consider. Indeed, two players following two different plays reaching a state z at time t will have the same preferences over the possible continuations of play. The view that strategies should be dependent only on payoff-relevant data is highlighted by Maskin and Tirole (2001) , who use it to motivate the development of the concept of Markov Perfect Equilibria. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) call this view the subgame-consistency principle, which Hellwig and Leininger (1998) describe as "the behaviour principle according to which a player's behaviour in strategically equivalent subgames should be the same, regardless of the different paths by which these subgames might be reached." Hence, the Markovian property of equilibrium strategies is, in fact, dictated by considerations of rationality and consistency.
In the discrete-time case of games of finite duration, equilibrium in Markovian strategies can be established easily by a backward induction argument; see, e.g., Zachrisson (1964) for the zero-sum case, and Rieder (1979) for the non-zero-sum case. 1 The continuous-time case is somewhat more delicate. Also for these games, Zachrisson (1964) shows that in the zero-sum case the players possess Markovian minmax strategies, and again characterizes them. However, the existence and characterization of Markovian equilibria in the non-zero-sum case have not yet been established.
Continuous-time infinite-horizon games have been studied by Guo and Hernández-Lerma, who examine both the undiscounted game in the zero-sum case under appropriate transience conditions (Guo and Hernández-Lerma, 2003 ) and the nonzero-sum case under discounted but unbounded payoffs (Guo and Hernández-Lerma, 2005 ). Neyman (2012) presents a framework for fairly general strategies, and proves the existence of uniform equilibria. Other than the works of these authors, there has been very little development in this direction.
A more common approach to continuous-time games has been via differential games, which were introduced by Isaacs (1951 Isaacs ( , published 1965 . These models employ a continuous-state space, and the state changes continuously over time. For the zero-sum case, as well as for optimization for the single decision-maker case, if the value function is smooth, 2 it is characterized as the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(-Isaacs) equation (henceforth, HJB); see Chapter 4 of Friedman (1971) . Since the value function is in general not smooth, it is more generally characterized as the viscosity solution of the appropriate HJB equation; these generalized solutions were introduced by Crandall and Lions (1983) to deal with the non-smoothness of the value function in optimization and other differential equations, and applied to differential games by Barron et al (1984) . When the game is non-zero-sum and equilibria exist in smooth Markovian strategies, the value function for each player 3 corresponding to this strategy profile also satisfies an appropriate HJB equation, which is now dependent on the other players' strategies; see Chapter 8 of Friedman (1971) . However, characterization in the more general case -where equilibria are not smooth -has not been established.
Another vexing issue is the interpretation of randomized strategies in the continuous-time game. As has been pointed out -e.g., by Judd (1985) -the notion of a continuum of independent random variables is ill defined in several relevant senses. One technique employed in differential games, due to Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) , has been to discretize time and replace the original strategies with strategies constant on the induced partition, and to choose the "average" action for that interval. This technique has not yet been applied to a large class of games.
Our Results
The main purposes of this paper are to show, by way of example, that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they do always exist in Markovian correlated strategies. These latter strategies are correlated via a public signal, chosen randomly by Nature at each point in time.
To this end, we develop several tools. The first pair of tools consists of a differential equation describing the evolution of the payoff as a function of initial state and time, and a differential inclusion which gives a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria. (These tools were developed by Miller (1968) in the case of a single player, using only pure strategies. Our proof of the equilibrium inclusions largely follows his. However, our proof of the evolution equation is direct, while Miller's (1968) uses the equilibrium inclusions and a duality theorem pertaining to differential equations.)
Another set of conditions similar to these, which can also be used to show that the example we present does not possess Markovian equilibrium, are the HJB equations for continuous-time stochastic games. 4 As part of the development of the HJB equations, we show that continuous-time stochastic games (in which only Markovian strategies are allowed) can be viewed as differential games in which players do not monitor others' actions; i.e., only open-loop strategies are used. The HJB equations for optimal control -in this case, applied to each player while the others hold their strategies fixed -reduce to the HJB equations for continuous-time stochastic games.
We also give an interpretation to equilibria in mixed-action strategies in continuous-time games. (As we pointed out in Section 1.1, mixed-action strategies in continuous-time are a problematic notion.) This will be done via a discretization of the continuous-time strategies similar to the one introduced by Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) (discussed in Section 1.1). However, we will take a different approach, since they worked only in a particular class of zero-sum games. Roughly speaking, given a partition of time, we will replace Markovian strategies with mixtures over pure strategies that are constant on subintervals. Players can use randomization to choose the action that they will play in each subinterval, and the expectation of their choices should be the expectation of the original Markovian strategy in each subinterval.
As a by-product of the technical machinery that we will develop in these approximations, we will easily deduce the existence of approximate Markovian 4 It is worth noting that in non-zero-sum differential games, the HJB equations are in general ill defined, in the sense that they don't possess unique solutions and the solutions do not depend in a continuous way on initial data; see the survey by Bressan (2011) . The lack of uniqueness in our case is not surprising given the usual multiplicity of Nash equilibria; however, it is not known to what extent the solutions are "well-behaved" in terms of dependence on initial data in our class of games -which, as we mentioned, can be viewed as a very special class of differential games. equilibria in all continuous-time stochastic games. We will also be able to state similar interpretations for the public-signal correlated equilibria, since a continuum of public signals is, for the same reasons, a problematic concept.
The construction of the example of a game without Markovian equilibria takes advantage of the structures of the manifold of Nash equilibria; in particular, it takes advantage of an example from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) , which shows that the set of equilibria in a game can be connected and yet not simply connected -in particular, it can be homeomorphic to a circle -and that even in such a case, each equilibrium can be stable, in the sense that it is the unique equilibrium of an appropriately perturbed game. This construction originally appeared in Levy (2012) in relation to discounted stochastic games which do not possess stationary equilibria. The reader is referred to there or Appendix B of this paper for details.
The intuition of the example is as follows: There is an "active state" in which the game begins, and an absorbing state with payoff 0. We will focus on a particular pair of players, C, D, out of a large set of players. If either of these two players expects a positive average payoff in the future, he will choose an action such that when the other players choose an equilibrium reply, he receives a negative payoff. And, conversely, a negative average payoff in the future will lead to a positive payoff. Hence, for both C, D, the payoff must always be 0; this is a result of the continuous time parameter. However, we take advantage of a non-simply connected structure of the equilibria of the other players -in particular, of players A, B -to have, at each point in time, at least one of the players C, D receives a non-zero payoff.
Layout of this Paper
Section 2 presents the model of continuous-time stochastic games. Section 3 gives the differential equation for the payoff function associated with a strategy profile, and Section 4 gives the optimality conditions for equilibria. Section 5 gives an interpretation of mixed strategies in continuous time and proves the existence of approximate equilibria. Section 6 presents, modulo the construction that appears in Levy (2012) or in Appendix B of this paper, the example of a continuous-time game that does not possess Markovian equilibria. Section 7 defines, characterizes, and proves the existence of correlated equilibria, and gives an interpretation of correlated strategies in continuous time. Section 8 shows how continuous-time stochastic games can be included in the framework of differential games, and gives the HJB equation. Section 9 gives some extensions of the model under which our results hold. 5 
The Model
Throughout, given a bounded function f : X → R for some set X, we denote
and given a finite set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability distributions over X.
The general framework for a continuous-time stochastic games -also called Markov Games; see Zachrisson (1964) -with finite duration consists of the following framework:
• A finite set of states Z.
• A finite set of players P.
• A finite set of actions I p for each p ∈ P. Denote I P := p∈P I p and
• A duration T ∈ R, T > 0.
• A payoff function r : Z × I P → R P .
• A transition rate µ : Z × Z × I P → R, where for all a ∈ I P and z ∈ Z, z ∈Z µ(z |z, a) = 0 and for all z = z, µ(z |z, a) ≥ 0.
• The payoff functions and transition rates both extend multi-linearly to mixed-action profiles.
Given an initial state z 0 ∈ Z, the game -which we denote Γ z0 -is played in continuous-time on the interval [0, T ]. The states are governed by a stochastic process, in which the probability of a transition from state z to a state z in time [t, t + h], during which the players play action profile a ∈ ∆ P (I), is given by µ(z |z, a) · h + o(h); we make this explicit in Proposition 1 below.
A Markovian strategy for player p ∈ P is a Lebesgue-measurable mapping 5 and the function P u satisfies P u (t, t) = I and P u (s, t) = P u (s, r)P u (r, t) for all t, s, r ∈ [0, T ]) such that:
• For all s ∈ [0, T ], P u (s, ·) (which is a row vector) is the unique absolutely continuous function which satisfies a.e. the differential equation
and which satisfies P (s, s) = I for all s, where (µ(u(s))) z,z = µ(z | z, u(z, s)).
• For each z 0 ∈ Z there is a probability space (Ω 
For a proof, see, e.g., Miller (1967) .
Remark 2. Miller (1967) shows that under the assumptions of the above proposition, for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ], it holds for all t ∈ [0, T ] that
This gives another interpretation of µ.
The following propositions also follow: Proposition 3. For each u ∈ A, z ∈ Z, and each s, t ∈ [0, T ], (P u (s, t)) z,z > 0.
Proposition 4. For each u ∈ A, bounded Borel-measurable mapping η : Z × ∆ P (I) → R and each z 0 ∈ Z, it holds that:
) is a vector with (η(u(s))) z = η(z, u(z, s)), and , denotes the standard inner product.
We will continue to use the notations from Propositions 1 and 4, and we will write z instead of z ω .
The payoff in the game starting in state z 0 for Player p is given by:
A profile u ∈ A is a Markovian equilibrium if for every z 0 ∈ Z, every p ∈ P and every τ p ∈ A p , we have
Evolution of the Payoff Function
Given a Markovian strategy profile u, for each t ∈ T , let u t : Z × [0, T − t] → ∆ P (I) be defined by u t (z, s) = u(z, s + t). Also denote, for each t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ Z, and p ∈ P,
where
can be viewed as the payoff to a player p who begins playing at time t in state z under the profile u. Denote, for z ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, T ],
where µ(z, ·) = (µ(z | z, ·)) z ∈Z , and
with boundary condition ψ(T ) = 0.
(b) For all z ∈ Z, and a.e. t,
Proof. (b) follows immediately from (a). The uniqueness in (a) follows from slightly generalized versions of the standard uniqueness theorems for ordinary differential equations; see, e.g., Section 2.2 of Coddington and Levinson (1972) . 6 We will show that γ p u (z, ·) indeed satisfies (3.3) a.e.. Let P u (t) := P u (0, t). Let 0 < t < T and let |h| 1. Since the strategies are Markovian, we have P u (t, t + h) = P ut (h), and hence, 6 Although the theorems there are stated for dynamics of the form dx dt = f (t, x) when f is continuous in both parameters, it is remarked there that one can derive similar results with minor changes when f satisfies only measurability in the time coordinate.
I, we have from Remark 2 that for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
so we deduce the desired result.
An Optimality Condition
where N E (resp. N EP ) denotes the Nash equilibria (resp. Nash equilibria payoff ) correspondence, which assigns to each normal-form game its set of Nash equilibria (resp. Nash equilibria payoffs).
This theorem was established for the single-player case by Miller (1968) , and our proof follows his.
Proof. Denote P u (t) := P u (0, t). Let u be a strategy profile, fix a Player p ∈ P, and let Ξ be a profile which differs only (at most) in the strategy of Player p. We first establish
where we recall that γ
is absolutely continuous (as P u , P Ξ and γ p u are absolutely continuous and bounded) we have
Combining this with
gives (4.1).
(4.1) now shows that if u p is such that for a.e. t and all z, u p z (t) maximizes
then u p is a best reply to u −p . On the other hand, suppose u p is a best reply to u −p but that for some ξ ∈ Z and all t in a set S of positive measure, u
. We contend that there exists a strategy Ξ p for Player p such that for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and any z ∈ Z,
Indeed, the existence of such Ξ p follows from standard Borel measurable selection theorems (e.g., Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski (1965) or Himmelberg (1975) ). In particular,
with strict inequality when z = ξ and t ∈ S; hence, since the diagnol elements of
Interpretation of Mixed Strategies in Continuous Time and Existence of Approximate Equilibria
It is well known, e.g., Judd (1985) , that there is no well-defined notion of a continuum of i.i.d. random variables. Hence, the notion of using mixed actions in continuous-time games is problematic, as the randomization cannot be carried out at each instant. In this section, we introduce a method for approximating strategies using mixed actions by strategies by a new type of strategies, which also employ randomization but only at finitely many points in time, resulting in a sequence of approximate equilibria which converge in the appropriate sense. This technique is based on an idea 7 introduced by Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) . In doing so, we will deduce the existence of Markovian ε-equilibria.
Let T be a finite partition of [0, T ] into intervals; we identify T with the set of left-most points of those intervals; i.e., {t 0 , . . . , t k } with 0 = t 0 < · · · < t k < T , or for brevity, T = {0 = t 0 < · · · < t k < T }. A T-Markovian strategy (or T-strategy for short) of Player p is a mapping w p : Z × T → ∆(I p ). The interpretation is that at the beginning of each interval of the partition, Player p performs his randomization of which pure action he will play at each state he may find himself in during that time interval. The collection of all such strategies for Player p will be denoted Σ p (T), which can be identified with (∆(I p )) Z×T , and Σ(T) = p∈P Σ p (T). The collection of T-strategies for Player p which choose only pure actions (and, hence, can be identified with (I p ) Z×T ) will be denoted S p (T), and
Markovian strategy bŷ
w p (z, t) can be interpreted as the expectation of the action of Player p used at time t in state z if he uses the T-Markovian strategy w p . It is, however, the inverse operation that will be crucial for our purposes.
For T = {0 = t 0 < · · · < t k < T }, as above, (T) = max 0≤j<k |t j+1 − t j |, where t k+1 = T for such T. For each player p and each Markovian strategy
where both sides are elements of ∆(I p ). We will call w p T the T-adapted version of u p . This terminology applies to profiles of T-strategies as well.
We define the payoff under a profile w ∈ Σ(T) in state z ∈ Z by
where on the right-hand side, each v ∈ S(T) is identified with the pure Markovian strategy it induces. Indeed, the interpretation of (5.3) is that the players randomize (either at the outset of the game or at the beginning of each time interval; because of the lack of monitoring it does not matter) which action profile will be played for each state in each of the intervals.
We would also like to define a notion of payoff when one player uses (or, conceptually, deviates to) a Markovian strategy when the other players use only T-strategies. Let p ∈ P and let w −p ∈ q =p Σ q (T). Then we define for each Markovian strategy u p of Player p,
Hence, we say that w ∈ Σ(T) is an ε-equilibrium of Γ z (T) if no player has a deviation, with a profit of more than ε, to a Markovian strategy in the game with initial state z.
Note that for each z ∈ Z, the game in which the players choose an action profile in Σ(T), and payoffs are given by (5.3), is a finite normal-form game.
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Let this game be denoted Ψ z (T). Also denote for strategy profiles u, y ∈ A the L 1 distance between them, defined by
For ε ≥ 0, a profile u ∈ A is a Markovian ε-equilibrium if for every z 0 ∈ Z, every p ∈ P, and every τ p ∈ A p , we have
Note that a Markovian 0-equilibrium is simply an equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Every continuous-time stochastic game possesses a Markovian ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0. Furthermore, for each game, there is
As we show in Section 6, a continuous-time stochastic game need not possess a Markovian equilibrium. 
(c) If u is an ε-Markovian equilibrium, ε ≥ 0, then there is a sequence of positive numbers (ε n ) n∈N with lim sup n→∞ ε n ≤ ε, such that for all z, w n is an
This justifies the use of Markovian strategies in equilibrium or ε-equilibrium. If the players wish to implement an equilibrium profile u = (u p ) p∈P of Markovian strategies, they can discretize time arbitrarily fine via a partition T and use the T-adapted version w; if T is fine enough, no player can profit significantly by deviating, either to another T-strategy or even to a Markovian strategy.
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 rely on four lemmas. First, note that for any two action profiles a, b ∈ ∆ P (I),
Lemma 6 follows from standard discrete-time dynamic programming arguments. The proofs of Lemmas 7, 8 , and 9 appear in Appendix A.
Lemma 6. For each game and each partition T of [0, T ], there exists w ∈ Σ(T), which is an equilibrium in Ψ z (T) for every z ∈ Z.
Lemma 7. For each game, there exists M > 0 such that for any two Markovian strategy profiles u, y ∈ A,
Lemma 8. For each game, there exists a K > 0 such that for every partition T, the following statements hold: (a) Let u ∈ A be any Markovian strategy profile, and let w ∈ Σ(T) be the T-adapted version of u. Then for all t ∈ T ,
where we define P w (t) = v∈S(T) w[v] · Pv(t), and
(b) Let p ∈ P be a player, let u −p ∈ q =p A q be any Markovian strategy profile for the other players, and let w −p ∈ Σ(T) be the T-adapted version of u −p . Then for all t ∈ T and all u p ∈ A p ,
where we define
, and
Note that for w ∈ Σ(T), (P w (t)) z,z is indeed the probability of being in state z in time t if v is chosen according to w and z(0) = z.
Lemma 9. For each game, there exists C > 0 such that for any partition T, any set of Player p ∈ P, and any Markovian profile u −p ∈ q =p A q for the other players with T-adapted versions w −p ,
Proof. (of Theorem 3). Let T be a partition of [0, T ], and let C, K be as in Lemmas 8 and 9. Let w be an equilibrium of Ψ z (T) for each z ∈ Z; by Lemma 6, at least one such equilibrium exists. Take u =ŵ; we contend that u is a (C + K) (T)-equilibrium of the continuous-time game.
Observe that since for each Player p ∈ P, u −p =ŵ −p , Lemmas 8 and 9 show that sup
since w is an equilibrium of Ψ z (T). Hence, take D = C + K. For (c), first we show that there exist (κ n ) n∈N , lim sup n→∞ κ n ≤ ε, such that w n is a κ n -equilibrium in Γ z (T n ). Indeed, we will define
and we need to show that κ n → 0. It's enough to show that for each p ∈ P, z ∈ Z, if δ n (p, z) := sup
then lim sup n→∞ δ n (p, z) ≤ ε. By parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 8, there is K > 0 such that
since u is an equilibrium (and taking the norm over fewer coordinates only decreases the L 1 distance.) By our assumptions, and by (a), lim sup n→∞ δ n (p, z) ≤ ε.
Lemma 9 now shows that if we set ε n = κ n + C · (T n ) for the appropriate C > 0 and all n ∈ N, then since w n is a κ n -equilibrium of Γ z (T n ), it also an ε n -equilibrium of Ψ z (T n ). Furthermore, lim sup n→∞ ε n ≤ ε by (a).
A Game without Markovian Equilibria
This section introduces some preliminary notations and results that we will need. 15 
Some Notation
• If p is a mixed action over an action space A and a ∈ A, then p[a] denotes the probability that p chooses A.
• If g is some payoff vector to some set of players P, and T ⊆ P, then g T denotes the restriction of the vector to the players in T .
• Similarly, if a is an action profile of the players in P and T ⊆ P, a T is the vector of strategies of players in T .
• If Λ is a normal form game on some set of players, and α is a strategy profile of those players, then Λ(α) denotes the resulting payoff vector. If T ⊆ P, then Λ T (α) (resp. Λ −T (α)) denotes the payoff to the players in T (resp. in T c ).
• For such Λ, α, and T ⊆ P, Λ T (·, α −T ) denotes the expected normal-form game facing the players in T when the other players are restricted to playing α −T .
Properties of The Fundamental Normal Form Games
In this section, we state the components and properties of a normal-form game (which is also dependent on a parameter) around which our example is constructed. This normal-form game was constructed in Levy (2012) to construct a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states that does not possess a stationary equilibrium. There reader is referred to there for the construction and the proof of Proposition 10 below.
The components of the game are the following:
• The players are P = {A, B, C, D, θ 1 , . . . , θ M }, where M ∈ N.
• The action set of Player A is {T, M, B}.
• The action set of Player B is {L, C, R}.
• The action set of each of the players θ 1 , . . . , θ M is {L, R}.
• The action set of each player C, D is {−1, 1}.
• The payoff r ω (which depends on the parameter ω = (ω C , ω D ) ∈ R 2 ) will be the sum of two payoffs, r ω := r 1 + r 2,ω , where r 1 is independent of ω.
• The payoff to Players C, D under r 1 is not dependent on the actions of C, D; that is, if a, b are two action profiles with a −{C,D} = b −{C,D} , then r
• The second payoff function r 2,ω is dependent on ω. It gives 0 payoff to all players other than C, D: That is, r −{C,D} 2,ω ≡ 0. To players C, D, r 2,ω is dependent only on a C,D and is given by:
Let G ω denote the game resulting from choice of parameter ω. The following proposition contains the main properties of G ω that we will need: Proposition 10. Let ω ∈ R 2 , and let a be an equilibrium profile in the game G ω . The following properties hold:
• The payoffs to C, D in r 1 (a) are not both 0; that is, r
(This is regardless of ω.)
The Example
• The players and their actions are P = {A, B, C, D, θ 1 , . . . , θ M } as in Section 6.2, along with the actions sets as given there.
• The set of states is Z = {z 0 , 0}, where 0 is an absorbing state of payoff 0.
We only need to define the payoffs in/transitions from z 0 , hence we will often drop reference to the state, as explicitly done below.
• The payoff function is r(·) := r(z 0 , ·) := r 1 (·), where r 1 is as in Section 6.2.
• The transition rate µ : I P → R, where we write µ(·) := −µ(z 0 | z 0 , ·) ≥ 0 (the intensity of the flow out of z 0 ) is determined by the actions of Players C, D, and is given by:
Suppose that u is a Markovian equilibrium. Denoting γ u (·) := γ u (z 0 , ·), X u (t, ·) := X u (z 0 , t, ·). We can now write (3.2) explicitly as:
for all p ∈ P, and we can write the conclusions of Theorem 1 and 2 in this game explicitly:
and for a.e. t ∈ [0, 1],
Remark 11. Since we are assuming that u is an equilibrium, we could have deduced (6.1) and (6.2) from Theorem 7 as well.
The following three lemmas are immediate:
where r ω is of Section 6.2,
and ξ u is given by ξ 
Lemma 14. Let N be a finite set of players, let I 1 , . . . , I N be action spaces, and let g 1 , g 2 : N × I 1 × · · · × I 2 → R N be two payoff functions, such that for any p ∈ N and any pair of pure action profiles a, b which differ (at most) in Player p's action, g
Then the set of Nash equilibria under g 1 is the same as the set of Nash equilibria under g 2 .
Note that under ξ u (t, ·), each player's payoff is independent of his own action. Combining this observation with Lemma 14 (where g 1 (·) = X u (t, ·) and g 2 (·) = r ω(t) (·)), Lemma 12, Proposition 10, and the requirement (6.2), we deduce that for a.e. t ∈ [0, 1],
• Regardless of the values of γ
From these, we deduce:
• By Lemma 13, in the interval J :
Hence, the above observations and (6.1) and show that for a.e. t ∈ J, if γ C (t) > 0 (resp. < 0), then dγ C dt (t) > 0 (resp. < 0), and similarly with γ D (t) and
• (6.3), (6.1), and Lemma 13 imply that for a.e. any t ∈ J, if γ
• In particular, it follows that for a.e. t ∈ [0, 1], it holds for at least one j ∈ {C, D} that
We have deduced above that for at least one j ∈ {C, D}, γ j is non-zero somewhere, and hence G is not uniformly 0. γ C , γ D are absolutely continuous and hence a.e. differentiable, hence, it holds a.e.,
G is absolutely continuous, as both γ C , γ D are absolutely continuous (and bounded). Therefore, since G ≥ 0 a.e. and G is positive at some point, we deduce G(d) > 0, a contradiction.
Public-Signal Correlated Equilibrium
Fix a non-atomic probability space (Ω, ν). This will be the signal space.
Definition and Existence
A public-signal correlated Markovian strategy (or a correlated strategy for short) for Player p is a measurable 10 mapping
. Intuitively, at each point in time t ∈ [0, T ], Player p observes a signal ω chosen from Ω, and plays in state z ∈ Z the mixed action σ p (z, t, ω).
For a correlated strategy profile σ = (σ p ) p∈P , define for all z ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, T ],
u σ is Lebesgue-measurable (by Fubini's theorem), but in general is not a Markovian strategy; that is, each u σ (z, t) is a distribution over p∈P I p , and it is not necessarily a product distribution. However, the transition rate function µ and the payoff function r extend linearly to ∆( p∈P I p ), and hence P uσ , γ uσ , and X uσ can be defined as in Proposition 1, (2.2), and (3.2); we will denote them as P σ , γ σ , and X σ for clarity, and indeed, the dynamics induced by u σ is associated with σ. Note also that Proposition 4 holds for correlated strategy profiles, with u σ replacing u. It is worth noting that if λ : ∆( p∈P ∆(I p )) → R is any linear function (be it payoffs, transition rates, etc.), then for all z ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, T ],
A public-signal correlated strategy σ is a public-signal correlated Markovian equilibrium (or a correlated equilibrium for short) if for every z 0 ∈ Z, every p ∈ P and every correlated strategy τ p for Player p, we have
Theorem 5. Let σ be a public-signal correlated strategy. Then σ is a publicsignal correlated Markovian equilibrium iff for all z ∈ Z, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], and ν-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, σ(z, t, ω) ∈ N E X σ (z, t, ·) .
Proof. For a correlated strategy σ and a deviation τ p for Player p, denote Ξ = (τ p , σ −p ); the parallel of (4.1) is:
where u(t, ω) = (u(z, t, ω)) z∈Z , X(t, a) = (X(z, t, a z )) z∈Z , and similarly for r p , µ, as was the convention in Section 4. (7.1) can be established along the same lines as (4.1), using the fact that (3.3) now becomes
and (2.1) becomes
Given (7.1) the proof now follows as in the proof Theorem 2.
Theorem 6. Every continuous-time stochastic game of fixed duration possesses a public-signal correlated equilibrium.
Proof. For each z ∈ Z, let F z : R P×Z → R P be the mapping which assigns to
where N EP is the Nash-equilibrium payoff correspondence, let
where x p = (x p z ) z∈Z and conv(·) denotes the convex hull, and let G :
The correspondence G is easily seen to be upper semi-continuous (as is the Nash equilibrium payoff correspondence), and also for all x ∈ R P×Z , (1977)), there exist for each z ∈ Z Borel measurable mappings g z,0 , . . . , g z,n , α z,0 , . . . , α z,n : S → R n such that for all t ∈ S:
||G(x)||
• n j=0 α j,z (ω) = 1, and for all j, a j,z ≥ 0.
• For all j = 0, . . . , n, g z,j (ω) ∈ F z (ω).
•
By the definition of F z , we deduce from the measurable implicit function theorem (see, e.g., Section 3.6 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) ) that there are Borelmeasurable f 0,z , . . . , f n,z : S → p∈P ∆(I p ) such that for all t ∈ S, j = 0, . . . , n, p ∈ P, z ∈ Z,
where recall that N E is the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Since every non-atomic probability space is isomorphic to the unit interval with Lebesgue measure, we may assume w.l.o.g. that Ω = [0, T ], and ν is the Lebesgue measure. Define for j = 0, . . . , n, t ∈ S,
and β −1 ≡ 0 (note that β n ≡ 1), and then define for each
It then follows from (7.4) that for each z ∈ Z and a.e.
and also ζ(T ) = 0. Therefore, by part (a) of Theorem 1, ζ p z (t) = γ p uσ (z, t), i.e., ζ p z (t) = γ p σ (z, t), for all t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ Z, p ∈ P. As such, it follows from the definition of β and σ, and from (7.5) , that for a.e.
and hence, by Theorem 5, σ is a correlated equilibrium.
Interpretation of Correlated Strategies
Given that equilibria may not exist in Markovian strategies but always exist in correlated strategies, and given that a continuum of i.i.d. random variables is a ill-defined concept (e.g., Judd (1985)), we will provide an interpretation of correlated strategies in continuous time. We proceed in a way similar to Section 5.
For any partition T = {0 = t 0 < · · · < t k < T } of [0, T ] and any finite partition 12 Q of Ω into sets of positive measure, let a T ×Q-correlated strategy of Player p be a mapping w p : Z ×T ×Q → ∆(I p ), where Q is viewed as a finite set. The interpretation is the following: At the beginning of each interval induced by the partition T, an element of Q -interpreted as a "region" in Ω -is chosen by Nature by the distribution induced on it by ν -that is, ν(S) = ν(∪ B∈S B). Player p then performs his randomization on what pure action he would play at any state during that time interval, given the that the signal is in the element Nature chose, and then plays the same resulting pure action throughout that interval. 13 The collection of all such strategies for Player p will be denoted Σ p (T, Q), and Σ(T, Q) = p∈P Σ p (T, Q). The collection of T × Q-strategies for Player p which choose only pure actions (and, hence, can be identified with (I p ) T×Q ) will be denoted S p (T, Q), and S(T, Q) = p∈P S p (T, Q). An element
where [ω] Q is the element of Q containing ω.ŵ p (z, t, ω) can be interpreted as the expectation of the action of Player p used at time t in state z upon receiving signal θ if he uses the T, Q-correlated strategy w p .
For a partition Q of Ω, denote ℘(Q) = max S∈Q ν(S). For each player p and each Markovian strategy
where both sides are elements of ∆(I p ). We will call w p T,Q the T, Q-adapted version of u p . This terminology applies to profiles of T, Q-strategies as well.
Payoffs under T, Q-correlated strategy profiles, as well as when one player deviates to a general correlated strategy, are defined analogously to (5.3), (5.4), as well as to the notions of equilibria in Σ z (T, Q) and to the game Ψ z (T, Q).
Finally, we say that (Q n ) ∞ n=1 is a regular sequence of partitions of (Ω, ν) if:
• For ν-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, {ω} = ∩ n [ω] Qn .
• For any f ∈ L 1 (Ω, ν) it holds, for ν-a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
For example, if Ω is a subset of a Euclidian space, ν is absolutely continuous w.r.t. to the Lebesgue-measure, and each Q n consists of cubes (of the appropriate dimension), with volume going to 0 as n → ∞. Also denote for correlated strategy profiles u, y, the
and let (Q n ) ∞ n=1 be a regular sequence of partitions of (Ω, ν). Then for any profile of correlated strategies
(c) If u is a correlated equilibrium, then there is a sequence of positive numbers (ε n ) n∈N with ε n → 0, such that for all z, w n is a ε n -equilibrium of Ψ z (T n , Q n ) and of Γ z (T n , Q n ).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. Lemmas analogous to Lemmas 7, 8, and 9 hold, except that (T) + ℘(Q) replaces (T), and they are proved along the same lines.
Continuous-Time Stochastic Games as Differential Games and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
In the following sections, when we refer to differentiability on a closed set (resp. at a boundary point), we mean that the function can be extended to an open neighborhood of that set on which it is differentiable (resp. such that it is a differentiability point of the extended function.)
Differential Games
We recall a standard model of non-zero-sum continuous-time differential games, e.g., Chapter 8 of Friedman (1971), of which continuous-time stochastic games will then be a particular model of.
• There is a closed, convex set of states X ⊆ R n .
• A compact, convex set of actions J p ⊆ R np for each p ∈ P. Denote J P = p I p .
• A duration T > 0.
• A payoff function r :
• A mapping f : X × J P → R N .
• An initial state x 0 ∈ X.
We assume that f and r satisfy:
• f, r are locally Lipschitz in the second coordinate, and on each compact set, the Lipschitz constant can be taken to be time-independent.
• There exists α, β > 0 such that |f (t, x, u)|, |r(t, x, u)| ≤ (α + β · ||x|| ∞ ) for all t, x, u.
• For all x ∈ X, there is ε > 0 such that for all u ∈ J P and all 0 ≤ h < ε, x + h · f (x, u) ∈ X. We refer to this as the viability condition.
An (open-loop) strategy for Player p is a Lebesgue-measurable mapping
we do not consider more general strategies, and we denote the collection of such strategies U p , and U = p U p . Given a profile u = (u p ) p∈P of strategies, the dynamics of the game is given by:
with initial state x(0). By Theorem 1.1.3 in Friedman (1971), our assumptions imply that for each u ∈ U, t 0 ∈ [0, T ], x 0 ∈ R n , there is a unique absolutely continuous function satisfying (8.1) a.e. for which x(t) = x, which we denote x u,t0,x0 , or simply x u,x0 when t 0 = 0; the conditions we have assumed also ensure that the dynamics never leave the set X.
Given a profile of strategies u = (u p ) p∈P and an initial state x 0 , the payoff to Player p is
More generally, denote for t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ X,
The value function associated with the profile u is given for each p ∈ P d by
and
25
Remark 16. Note that V p u is independent of the strategy for Player p, and hence if there is only a single player, no strategy need be specified, and we will write V(x, t); single-player differential games are referred to as optimal control problems.
Proposition 17. Let Υ(x 0 ) be an optimal control problem with associated value function V, and assume that for almost every t, V is differentiable for all x ∈ X. (a) Let W : [0, T ] × X → R be such that W (T, ·) ≡ 0, and for a.e. t, W is differentiable at (x, t) for all x ∈ X. Then W = V iff
• W is Lipschitz.
• For a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and all x ∈ X, W satisfies
, and the Hamiltonian H is defined by
It is worth noting that the strong differentiability condition we have assumed on the value function (instead of demanding differentiability for a.e.
14 point in X × [0, T ], we demand that for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], it is differentiable at (x, t) for all x ∈ X) is rarely satisfied in general differential games. Consequently, most studies of differential games make use of the viscosity solutions introduced by Crandall and Lions (1983) . However, those differential games we will define to represent continuous-time stochastic games will satisfy this differentiability condition.
Proof. Part (a) follows from Theorem 5.7 of Frankowska et al (1995) . Although the statement there involves notation suited to much more general optimal control problems, I will avoid introducing these notations here and simply say that under our regularity properties, the statement there indeed implies part (a). I will however remark that we do necessarily need to refer to a work such as Frankowska et al. (1995) which deals with control systems in which the dynamics need only depend on time in a measurable way, a departure from the classical case of dynamics that are jointly continuous in both time and position.
Part (b) follows along standard lines;
15 to apply these arguments, one needs to observe that since the mapping x u,x0 is clearly Lipschitz and V is locally Lipschitz (this also follows from standard arguments), t → V (t, x u,x0 (t)) is also
Extensions
We mention here several elementary ways in which the model presented in Section 2 can be generalized such that the results of this paper still apply.
Firstly, one can allow the payoffs and transition rates to be time-dependent. That is, in Section 2, we could have specified the payoffs and transitions to be of the following form:
• A bounded 16 Lebesgue-measurable transition rate µ :
R, where for all a ∈ I P , z ∈ Z, and t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈Z µ(z |z, t, a) = 0, and for all z = z, µ(z |t, z, a) ≥ 0.
All the results in this paper remain correct under the appropriate notational changes.
Secondly, one can allow for a terminal payoff. That is, one can add to the components given in Section 2 a terminal payoff function g : Z → R P . The payoff for the game is then defined to be the accumulated payoff over the course of the game plus the terminal payoff in state z(T ); explicitly, (2.2) becomes
All of the results in this paper remain correct under this change as well, except that now one must modify Theorems 1 and 7 by altering the boundary condition to γ u (z, T ) = g(z) and V u (z, T ) = g(z), respectively. (The proofs in Section 5 also become a little more involved.)
Finally, one can allow for the action spaces of the players I 1 , . . . , I p to be compact metric spaces. In this case, we require the payoff function r and the transition rate function µ to be (jointly) continuous in the actions. 17 With the exceptions of Sections 5 and 7.2, which give interpretations of randomized/correlated strategies in continuous-time, the results of this paper hold with only very minor changes in the proofs. With some care, also in the case of compact action spaces, one can provide these notions with interpretations similar to those given in the aforementioned sections by discretizing the action spaces as well as time (and, in the latter case, the signal space).
Proof. (of Lemma 7) Note first that, ||A · B|| ∞ ≤ C ∞ ||A|| ∞ · ||B|| ∞ for an appropriate C ∞ > 0 and for any two |Z| × |Z| matrices A, B.
18 Further note that ||P u || ∞ ≤ 1 for any Markovian strategy u. Using these observations and (2.1) gives:
Therefore, an application of Gronwall's inequality -e.g., Hirsch and Smale, (1974) -gives (5.6) for appropriate M > 0. To prove (5.7), note that (3.1) shows that for each player p ∈ P and z ∈ Z, τ satisfying (T) < τ < min[T, 2 (T)], and let 0 = m 0 < m 1 < · · · < m n = k + 1 (recall t k+1 = T be such that τ < t mj − t mj−1 < 2τ for all 1 ≤ j < n; such a selection is possible. Denote: 
respectively. Note that each w ∈ Σ(T) induces an elements of Σ(
Z×T|j+ in the natural way, and this induced distribution is a product distribution on Σ(T| j+1 ) = Σ(T| j ) ⊗ Σ(T| j+ ). Note that for t ≤ t mj , P v|j (t) is well-defined, and for t mj ≤ t < t mj+1 and any z ∈ Z, v| j+ (z, t) is well-defined, see (5.1). Also observe that by the definition of w, for any t mj ≤ p < q < t mj+1 , we have for all z ∈ Z,
where we recall that a pure strategy v ∈ S(T) induces a pure Markovian strategy by (5.1). Finally, we note that for any Markovian strategy φ,
where C ∞ is as in the proof of Lemma 7. Hence, letting t mj ≤ p < t mj+1 , and denoting τ 0 = t mj , τ = t p − τ 0 , we have
By (10.2), the first two terms together are bounded by C ∞ (||µ|| ∞ ) 2 τ 2 . As for the second term, note that for 0 ≤ s ≤ τ ,
And hence, using (10.1),
Hence, (10.3) and (10.4) imply:
with initial condition D 0 = 0. In particular, if τ < 1 C∞||µ||∞ , we have
Since (T) · τ < t mj+1 − t mj for all 0 ≤ j < n, we have n < T (T) . Therefore,
and since τ ≤ 2 (T), this gives, denoting
This was under the assumption that τ < 1 C∞||µ||∞ , which can arranged as long as (T) < 1 C∞||µ||∞ ; but C can be enlarged so that and (10.5) holds for all values of (T). Finally, from (10.2), we have
which completes the proof of (5.8), with K = C + C ∞ ||µ|| ∞ . Now we prove prove (5.9). Fix 0 ≤ j < n, and denote τ = t mj+1 − t mj . Using (5.8) and techniques similar to those above, Table 11 (5) The set of Nash equilibria is hyperstable and homeomorphic to S.
(6) For each ε > 0, the maps 20 ψ and Γ ε can be taken to be piecewise linear, 8ε-Lipshitz, and satisfying the following property:
such that for any edge E of S, and for any equilibrium (x, y) of any game in Γ ε (E) it holds that
where ϑ is defined by
ϑ can be understood graphically: 20 In this case, ψ is a homeomorphism, and the retract ρ is the identity. 21 In the sense that each edge of the square is viewed as an interval.
Action Profile of A, B
Arc 6 / / (1, 1) The latter part of (6) can be stated informally: For any equilibria of a game assigned to a point on E via Γ ε , the expected payoff under ϑ is not too far from the edge opposite E. Indeed, in Section 11.3 we verify that property 22 (6) holds for the game given in (11.2). We remark that property (4) only serves to make concrete the notation in property (6) and below, and is completely irrelevant otherwise.
The following proposition is proved in Appendix B of Levy (2012):
(IV) If L denotes a Lipshitz constant of Q and if ||Q(p, q) − Q 0 || ∞ ≤ κ for some Q 0 , some κ, and all (p, q) ∈ S, then
The Normal-Form Game
We now turn to our normal-form game, and prove the properties given in Section 6.2. Fix ε ≤ min[ 
• The Players are A, B, θ 1 , . . . , θ M , where M as in Proposition 23 for the function Γ ε , as well as Players C, D.
• As in Proposition 23, Players A, B have action sets I = {T, M, B}, J = {L, C, R}, and each player θ j has action sets {L, R}; furthermore, Players C, D have action sets {1, −1}.
• The payoff r ω , will be the sum of two payoffs, r ω := r 1 + r 2,ω , defined separately as follows:
• The first payoff function r 1 satisfies r
, where ϑ is defined in property (6) of Section 11.1, and the payoff to the other players is the same as in the game of Proposition 23 when the profile a −{C,D} is played and the choice a C,D ∈ {+1, −1} 2 is made by Nature; namely, (a p,q , b p,q ) (which is not uniquely determined) must also go 'around' the square 'close to it' -at a distance of at most 4ε from the edge on which (p, q) lies, because of (11.4). (ii) Hence, if ω C > 0, then r Proof. The first part follows from (11.4) , and because C, D consider only the payoff from r 2,ω when making a decision. The second part follows from the first part and from (11.4), since we had chosen ε ≤ 
Construction from Kohlberg and Mertens' Game
Let G 0 be the game defined in Figure 11 .2; let E 1 , . . . , E 6 denote the 6 equilibria, beginning with (L, L) and proceeding clockwise, and let A i denote the arc from E i to E i+1,mod 6 . Also, for a two-player game G, the game G , defined by G i (a, b)) = G 3−i (b, a), is the game where the players and action profiles are switched.
Fix ε > 0; we begin by defining mappings G 1 , . . . , G 6 , G Z : [0, 1] → R 2×I×J , and from these we will define Γ ε .
• G 1 (t) := A\B L M R L 1 + ε, 1 + (1 − t)ε ε, −1 −1 + ε, 1 + t · ε M −1, (1 − t)ε 0, 0 −1, t · ε R 1, −1 0, −1 −2, −2
All equilibria in G 1 (t) lie on the arc A 1 .
All equilibria of G 2 (t) lie along A 2 .
All equilibria of G 3 (t) lie along A 3 .
• In each of these cases, all equilibria of G j lie along A j .
We then define (2(p + 1) ) if q = −1, p ≤ − From these figures and the explicit forms G 1 , . . . , G 6 , G Z and their equilibria properties listed above, it is immediate that Γ ε satisfies property (6) in Section 11.1.
